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In MITE Corporation v. Dixon,' the United States Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act2 had
been preempted by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 as amended
by the Williams Act,4 and that the Illinois statute created an unconsti-
tutional burden on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has noted
jurisdiction,' and its decision will have a major impact on the validity
of Illinois' statute and the takeover statutes of thirty-six other states.6
* Associated with the law firm of Gambrell & Russell, Atlanta, Georgia. B.G.S., Univer-
sity of Kentucky; M.A., University of Wisconsin; J.D., Emory University; LL.M., New York Uni-
versity. Member of New York Bar and Georgia Bar.
1. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
2. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121/2, §§ 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f) (1976).
5. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 101 S. Ct. 2043 (1981). (Oral arguments were heard Nov. 30, 1981.
The name change is due to the appointment of Mr. Edgar as Illinois' Secretary of State, replacing
Mr. Dixon who was elected United States Senator).
Not at issue in MITE is Commission Rule 14d-2(b). Promulgated by the Commission in
1979, Rule 14d-2(b) mandates that a tender offeror, within five days of publicly announcing the
material terms of the offer, either make the offer effective by providing certain information to the
holders of the subject company's stock, or publicly announce the withdrawal of the offer. The
Commission in adopting Rule 14d-2(b) attempted to create a conflict with state takeover statutes.
The Commission stated: "mhe conflict between Rule 14d-2(b) and [state takeover] statutes is so
direct and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with both sets of requirements as they
presently exist." 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329-30 (1979). However, the commission designed Rule 14(d)-
2(b) to apply only prospectively. See id. at 70,326. Thus, since the underlying events in the MITE
litigation took place before the effective date of 14(d)-2(b) the rule is not at issue in the case.
6. See note 2 supra. The other states' statutes are: ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-.120 (Supp.
1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to
-108 (Supp. 1980); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-456 to -468 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203
(Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAwAII REv. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15
(1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-.05 to -11 (Burns
Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.101-.612 (West Supp. 1981-82); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-
1276 to -1285 (1974); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 292.560-.991 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-
:1512 (West Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (1982); MD. CoRP. & Ass'Ns
CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1981); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. Il0C, §§ 1-13 (Michie/Law.
1
Bunch: Edgar v. Mite Corporation: A Proposed Analysis
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TULSA LAW JOURN4L [Vol. 17:229
This Article will review the court of appeals decision, the legisla-
tive history and purpose of the Williams Act, and the constitutional
issues presented by the MITE case. The author will argue that the
Court should uphold part and overturn part of the Illinois statute.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDaAR v MITE CoRORATIoN
A. Facts
In 1979, MITE Corporation and MITE Holdings, Inc. (collec-
tively MITE) made a tender offer for the shares of Chicago Rivet and
Machine Co. (Chicago Rivet), an Illinois corporation which has its
principal executive offices in Ilinois.7 Illinois residents owned approxi-
mately forty percent of Chicago Rivet's stock and constituted twenty-
seven percent of Chicago Rivet's shareholders.8 In an action in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, MITE
obtained an order enjoining the Illinois Secretary of State from enforc-
ing the Illinois statute in connection with the proposed tender offer for
the shares of Chicago Rivet. MITE also obtained a declaratory order
that the Illinois statute was invalid under the United States Constitu-
tion.9 MITE, after obtaining those orders, withdrew the tender offer
for the shares of Chicago Rivet,' 0 and the Illinois Secretary of State
appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Co-op Supp. 1981); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-.917 (Supp. 1981-1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-72-101 to -121 (Supp. 1981); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV.
REv. STAT. §§ 78.376 to -.3778 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-A:1 to :15 (1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to -18 (West Supp. 1981-1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1614 (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.041
(Baldwin 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 431-451 (West Supp. 1981-1982); 70 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981); S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to 35-2-130 (Supp. 1980);
S.D. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114
(1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -11 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.01-.25 (West Supp. 1981). Although Texas does not have a statute, its
Administrative Guidelines may be affected by the decision. Tex. Administrative Guidelines for
Minimum Standards in Tender Offers, 065.15.00.100, reprinted in 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
55,671-682 (1977).
7. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 488 (7th Cir. 1980).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 490.
10. Id. The court of appeals noted that even though the record did not indicate whether
MITE intended another tender offer for Chicago Rivet's shares, the civil and criminal liability to
which the firms would be exposed if the district court were reversed did not render the issues
moot. Id.
2
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B. Opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
In analyzing the issue of federal preemption, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the argument that congressional preemption of all state take-
over statutes may be inferred. The court stated that the federal scheme
of regulating tender offers is not "so pervasive that an implicit congres-
sional intent to preempt parallel state legislation may fairly be in-
ferred."1 The court reasoned that the "absence of an exclusive federal
interest in the field of securities regulation is persuasively demonstrated
by the historically coordinate role of state regulation in the field." 12
The court recognized that "the Williams Act may. . . be validly com-
plemented and investor protection furthered by state legislation.' 3
Thus, the court stated, the "crucial inquiry is whether the Illinois Act
differs from the Williams Act in such a way that achievement of the
congressional objective of investor protection is frustrated."'14
In holding that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois statute, the
court of appeals found the "most troublesome portion of the Illinois
Act""5 to be section 7E, which compels the Illinoig Secretary of State
upon determining that "the takeover offer is inequitable. . .[to] deny
the registration of the takeover offer or [to] condition its registration
upon certain changes or modifications."' 6 The court stated that this
provision of the Illinois Act adopted a "benevolent bureaucracy" ap-
proach to investor protection, which Congress had rejected. 17 The
court noted that "Congress contemplated only that investors be pro-
tected from acting in ignorance, not from their own well-informed
choice."' 18
The court also held unconstitutional the Illinois statute's provi-
sions for a twenty-day waiting period 19 and hearing20 prior to the com-
mencement of a tender offer falling within the ambit of the statute.
The court stressed that Congress refused to adopt a proposal which
provided for a prenotification period. The court felt that the provi-
11. Id. at 491.
12. Id. at 491-92 (footnote omitted).
13. Id. at 503.
14. Id. at 493 (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.57E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982) (cita-
tion omitted)).
17. Id. at 494.
18. Id.
19. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.54E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
20. Id. § 137.57A.
1981]
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sions' inherent potential for delaying the tender offer impermissibly en-
hanced the subject company's chance of successfully resisting the
tender offer.2'
In addition, the court held that the Illinois statute was invalid
under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. While
acknowledging that "[pirotecting resident investors is indisputably a le-
gitimate state objective,"22 the court concluded that "the benefits flow-
ing to Illinois shareholders from the Act are, to a significant degree,
speculative." 23 The court found that the substantial impact of the Illi-
nois statute on interstate commerce outweighed the state's interest in
regulating tender offers. The court noted that an order of the Secretary
of State prohibiting MITE'S tender offer might have blocked over 23
million dollars in interstate commerce.24 The court also held that the
Illinois statute's applicability to corporations not organized under the
laws of Illinois violated the commerce clause.25
III. OPERATION OF THE ILLINOIS BUSINESS TAKE-OVER ACT
Once the jurisdictional base of the Illinois statute is triggered, the
statute prohibits commencement of a tender offer until all the precom-
mencement requirements of the statute have been satisfied. The Illi-
nois statute requires a prospective tender offeror to file a registration
statement with the Illinois Secretary of State twenty business days
before commencing a tender offer.26 At the end of the twenty days, the
registration statement automatically becomes effective unless the Secre-
tary calls a hearing.27
The Secretary of State may call a hearing on a proposed tender
offer if a hearing is deemed necessary by the Secretary to protect Ii-
nois shareholders of the subject corporation. A hearing also may be
requested by Illinois shareholders owning ten percent of the subject
corporation's shares, or by a majority of the subject corporation's
outside directors. 28 A hearing must be requested within fifteen business
days after the filing of the registration statement.29 The Secretary's
21. 633 F.2d at 494-99.
22. Id. at 500.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 502.
25. Id. at 501-02.
26. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 121M, § 137.54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
27. Id. § 137.54E.
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hearing on the proposed tender offer is to commence within ten days of
the hearing request,3" and the Secretary's decision is to be issued within
fifteen days after the conclusion of the hearing.3 1
The Illinois statute mandates that a tender offer remain open for a
minimum of twenty calendar days.32 Shareholders of the subject com-
pany may withdraw their tendered shares either during the first seven-
teen calendar days after the tender offer is made or materially changed,
or sixty days after the initial date of the tender offer.33 The Illinois
statute further requires that when a tender offer is for less than all the
outstanding shares, the shares must be purchased pro rata, based on the
amount of shares tendered by shareholders of the subject company.34
Under the Illinois statute the subject company must also submit
any solicitation materials to the Secretary of State. 35 The subject com-
pany is not allowed to solicit against a tender offer before the tender
offer becomes registered except that the subject company can make any
communication with its shareholders allowed by the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.36
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TENDER OFFERS AND CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE-THE WILLIAMS ACT
In the 1960's, tender offers became a popular mechanism for ob-
taining control of a corporation.37 In conventional tender offers, the
offeror typically offers to purchase all or a portion of a company's
30. Id. § 137.57C.
31. Id. § 137.57D.
32. Id. § 137.59B.
33. Id. § 137.59C.
34. Id. § 137.59D.
35. Id. § 137.55.
36. Id. § 137.58(1).
37. See Preface to E. ARANOW, H. EINHoRN, & G. BERISTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL at v (1977) [hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS]. The fol-
lowing are some other factors which have been suggested as an explanation for the increased use
of tender offers for obtaining control of a corporation:
(1) Increased access to cash resulting from greater corporate liquidity and readily avail-
able credit;
(2) Relatively low price-earnings and cash or quick assets ratios, as well as compara-
tively low book values;
(3) Other means of obtaining control of the corporation, such as through proxy con-
tests, require those seeking control to convince shareholders that they are better
able to handle the affairs of the company than is the incumbent management,
whereas tender offers appeal to shareholders on a strictly monetary basis;
(4) The increasing respectability of tender offers as a takeover technique, along with
greater sophistication and knowledge regarding the use of the tender offer.
E. ARANow & H. EINHoRN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65-66 (1973).
1981]
5
Bunch: Edgar v. Mite Corporation: A Proposed Analysis
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TULSA LAWJO URNAL
shares at a premium price, with the offer to remain open for a limited
time. Frequently, the offeror's obligation to purchase is conditioned on
the aggregate number of shares tendered. If more shares are tendered
than desired, the offeror need not purchase the excess; if less than a
certain number are tendered, the offeror need not purchase any. The
shareholder responding to the offer, however, generally must relinquish
control of the shares he desires to tender until the response of others is
determined. 8
Tender offers typically do not involve the great irrevocable ex-
penditures associated with proxy fights. A tender offeror need not
purchase any shares tendered unless shareholders of the subject com-
pany tender sufficient shares to give the tender offeror control over the
subject company.3 9 The tender offeror's initial expenditures are gener-
ally limited to advertising fees, financing commitment fees, and legal
fees.
In 1968, Congress adopted the Williams Act "in response to the
growing use of cash tender offers as a means for achieving corporate
takeovers."'  The Williams Act filled a vacuum in the federal disclo-
sure scheme in connection with efforts to obtain control of a corpora-
tion. Proxy solicitations were governed by the Commission pursuant to
section 14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.41 An offer of se-
curities in exchange for shares of a company constituted a sale of secur-
ities within the meaning of section (2)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933,42
and thus required registration pursuant to the provisions of that Act.43
However, prior to the Williams Act, a tender offeror could avoid the
registration and disclosure requirements imposed by the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.44 A tender offeror
could restrict the time frame in which the offer would be outstanding,
38. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONo. &
AD. NEws 2811.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
40. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (footnote omitted).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b) (1976).
42. Id. § 77(b)(3).
43. Id. § 77f.
44. The Senate Report explained the need for the Williams Act:
Where one company seeks control of another by means of a stock-for-stock ex-
change, the offer must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933. The shareholder
gets a prospectus setting forth all material facts about the offer. He knows who the pur-
chaser is, and what plans have been made for the company. He is thus placed in a
position to make an informed decision whether to hold his stock or to exchange it for the
stock of the other company.
[Vol. 17:229
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demand that the tender of stock be irrevocable, and purchase the first
tendered shares if the offer was oversubscribed. These conditions pro-
duced panic among the subject company's shareholders, who were
afraid that if they did not tender quickly they would not have their
shares purchased by the tender offeror. Furthermore, once the share-
holders tendered they were locked into the tender offer.4
Advocates of the Williams Act expressed the view that tender of-
fers were often used as a means of obtaining control of a corporation by
paying a premium for the control block of shares of the corporation for
the undisclosed purpose of liquidating the acquired corporation.46
Thus, in passing the Williams Act, Congress focused on requiring
greater and more accurate disclosure by tender offerors to shareholders
of the subject company.47
The Williams Act contains four substantive provisions. A share-
holder of the subject company who has tendered shares to the tender
offeror may withdraw deposited securities within seven days of the
tender offer, and if the tender offeror has not purchased the tendered
shares, the shareholder may withdraw the tendered shares after sixty
days from the time of the tender offer.48 The withdrawal provisions
provide tendering shareholders an opportunity to accept opposing ten-
The cash tender offer is similar to a proxy contest, and the committee could find no
reason to continue the present gap in the Federal securities laws which leaves the cash
tender offer exempt from disclosure provisions.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967).
45. See note 38 supra.
46. Senator Kuchel, a sponsor of the Williams Act, stated:
It can be argued that a cash tender offer is a straightforward business proposition
which may be rejected by a stockholder or accepted by him, usually at a price in excess
of the market price. But where no information is known about the prospective purchas-
ers or their plans, the shareholder may be ignorantly participating in the rape of the
corporation. Control and liquidation are often attempted under the secretive guise of the
cash tender offer. If this be the case, the shareholders can be deprived of their rightful
participation in the liquidation. Indeed, the stock of a major American corporation can
be purchased, and the corporation controlled and liquidated without any knowledge on
the part of the shareholders to whom the cash tender offer was addressed.
113 CONG. REc. 9338 (1967).
47. [B]y using a cash tender offer the person seeking control can operate in almost com-
plete secrecy. At present, the law does not even require that [the offeror] disclose his
identity, the source of his funds, who his associates are, or what he intends to do if he
gains control of the corporation. . . .
This bill is designed to make the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair
opportunity to make their decision.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong. Ist Sess. 2, 3 (1967).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976). Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 14(d)7 adds
additional withdrawal rights. Pursuant to the rule, tendering shareholders may withdraw their
shares up to fifteen days after commencement of the date of the offer and up to ten business days
after the commencement of another bidder's tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1981).
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ders and prevent tender offerors from tying up the shareholders'
shares.49
If within ten days of the tender offer, more securities are tendered
than are to be accepted, the tender offeror must purchase the shares on
a pro rata basis based upon the number of shares tendered by each
shareholder.5 0 This provision reduces the need for a hurried invest-
ment decision by a subject company's shareholders who fear that their
shares will not be accepted if not tendered immediately.-"
Frequently the first offering price of a tender offer is not attractive
enough to obtain the desired quantity of shares. Thus the tender of-
feror will make a new offer at a higher price in an effort to obtain the
desired number of shares. The Williams Act provides that if the tender
offeror raises the offering price before the expiration of the tender offer,
the increased price must be paid to all tendering shareholders, includ-
ing those who tendered before the increase in the offering price. 2 This
provision protects persons who tender early in the tender offering pe-
riod by requiring that any modification of the initial tender offer, which
offers a higher price to persons who have not tendered, to be accompa-
nied by a similar offer to persons who had already tendered. 3 The
Williams Act also prohibits false or misleading statements and fraudu-
lent acts by any person in connection with a tender offer.-4
49. Professor Manne has criticized the seven-day withdrawal provision of the Williams Act
as increasing the cost of tender offers.
It is hard to imagine a more unsettling kind of arrangement. It will be difficult and
costly for offerors to keep their financing commitments intact for this additional week.
This provision in effect requires offerors to give a seven-day "put" to all shareholders for
no compensation. If the market goes down for any reason, these shareholders will be in
the strange position of having an option to sell. If it goes up, however, they are not
obliged to sell. Clearly this kind of risk assumption, as the normal commercial market
for puts indicates, is costly.
Manne, Cash Tender Offersfor Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE L.J. 231, 251
(1967).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
51. See note 38supra.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976). Rule 10(b)-13 also makes it unlawful for the tender offeror,
from the time of the public announcement of the tender offer, to purchase or enter into an agree-
ment to purchase any of the subject company's securities of the class sought in the tender offer
except pursuant to the tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1981).
53. This provision has been criticized by Professor Manne who has stated:
It is no proof of an invidious form of price discrimination that identical goods may be
acquired at varying prices at different times, and there is no logic known to economic
theory or law dictating that individual contracts should not be enforced merely because
at a later time the price goes up. . . . The net effect of the bill's provision is simply to
raise the cost of acquiring corporate controL . . .
Manne, supra note 49, at 248.
54. Section 14(e) of the Securities and Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
8
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The theory of the Williams Act is that public confidence in the
integrity of the securities market requires shareholders of the subject
company to have the opportunity to make an informed and calculated
choice whether to sell or to hold stock when confronted with a tender
offer.55 To accomplish this, the Williams Act requires full disclosure of
the future plans of the tender offeror-information without which an
informed investment decision cannot be made.56 Within ten days after
obtaining beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a corpora-
tion's stock, a person must fie a schedule 13D with the SEC, any stock
exchange on which the subject company's securities are listed, and the
subject company.57 Schedule 13D requires those persons to disclose
information about their identity, background, financing, support, and
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in
any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in
opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The Court, in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976), defined materiality in the context of a proxy solicitation under section 14(a) of the 1934
Act as follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote .... Put another way, there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of infor-
mation made available.
Id. (footnote omitted). This definition has been applied in the tender offer area. Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 50-51 (1977) (Blackmun, J. concurring).
55. The importance of public confidence in the securities market was emphasized in a speech
by Manuel F. Cohen, former Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Associ-
ation of the Bar of the City of New York (April 14, 1967), reprinted in Hearings on S. 510 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
203-04 (1967).
In many cases, public investors know little or nothing about the person or company
making the offer, what the exact conditions of the offer are, or what it means for the
future of their company or their investment. In these circumstances trading is character-
ized by rumor, by speculation and by fear, characteristics which are hardly conducive to
public confidence in the securities market. Over the past thirty-odd years we have all
worked hard to foster that confidence, partly by requiring public disclosure of important
events that affect a company and its securities. An attempt to acquire a substantial or
controlling interest in a company is such an event, whether it is made by means of a
stock-for-stock exchange offer, or a cash tender offer, or a private or open-market
purchase. Unless public investors have the feeling that they "know what is going on" in
one of these situations, they will suspect the worst, and they will lose confidence in the
fairness and honesty of the securities markets.
Id.
56. See H.R. Rep. No. 1711, supra note 38. The underlying postulate of all securities regula-
tion, that providing the investor with the material information concerning a security or security
transaction will enable the investor to make an informed investment decision, has been ques-
tioned. See Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1151 (1970).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1981).
9
Bunch: Edgar v. Mite Corporation: A Proposed Analysis
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TULSA LAW JOUNrAAL [Vol. 17:229
future plans .5  Additionally, at the initiation of a tender offer, the
tender offeror must file with the Commission and publish or send to
shareholders of the subject company a schedule 14D-1 which requires
the disclosure of information such as: (1) material financial disclosures
by the tender offeror; (2) any past transactions by the tender offeror
with the subject company; (3) any possible antitrust or regulatory
problem resulting from the success of the tender offer; and (4) informa-
tion showing compliance with the margin requirements of section 7 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.19
V. PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
A. Securiies Exchange Act of 1934
Preemption is not to be lightly inferred.60 When the exercise by a
state of its police power is challenged under the supremacy clause of
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1981). Unfortunately Schedule 13D disclosures usually conceal
more than they reveal about the purchaser's plans with regard to the subject corporation. The
following is a typical 13D statement:
The Corporation did not at the time of the purchases described herein and does not
presently have any plan to acquire control of the Issuer. The Corporation has in the past
analyzed the results of and considered the possibiliy of acquiring control of the Issuer.
The Corporation may consider seeking representation on the Board of Directors of the
Issuer in the future. The Corporation may suggest business strategies, which might in-
dude acquisitions, dispositions and changes in dividend policy and management, to theIssuer in the future. The Corporation may consider the possibility of acquiring control
of the Issuer in the future. The Corporation has not had any discussions with the Issuerwit  respect to acquisition of cont ol epresentati n on the Board of Direc ors or busi-
ness strategies. Since the Corporation may consider seeking to acquire control of the
Issuer or obtain representation on the Board of Directors of the Issuer, or since the Cor-poration may suggest business strategies to the Issuer, the Corporation's position cannot
be considered solely that of a passive investor. However, it should not be assumed thatthe Corporation will formulate a plan to acquire control of the Issuer or seek representa-
tion on the Board of Directors of the Issuer or suggest business strategies to the Issuer.
The Corporation has been buying and may continue to buy shares of the Issuer. Subject
to the conditions set forth below, the Corporation is presently seeking a significant posi-
tion in the Issuer which might amount to about 20% of the shares of the Issuer. The
Corporation intends to continuously review its position in the Issuer and may, depending
on its evaluation of the Issuer's business and prospects and upon future developments(including, but not limited to, the attitude of the Board of Directors and management of
the Issuer, general economic conditions and money and stock market conditions), deter-
mine to cease buying shares of the Issuer or to increase or decrease its position in theIssuer. The Corporation does not presently intend to make a tender offer for shares of
the Issuer or propose to the Issuer a merger or similar transaction. As part of its continu-
ing review of its position in the Issuer, the Corporation may change its present intention
and determine to make a tender offer for shares of the Issuer or propose to the Issuer a
merger or similar transaction.
Lipton, Open Market P"urcha.r, 32 Bus. LAW. 1321, 1328-29 (1977).
59. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1981).60. The preemption doctrine arises from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion which states the United States Constitution and federal law "made in Pursuance thereof
(.. shall be the supreme Law of the Land";.. . U.S. CoN sT. art. VI, cL 2.
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the United States Constitution the Supreme Court starts its analysis
"with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress. 61
Section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that
"[nlothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with
the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereun-
der."62 In Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.,63 the Supreme Court
rejected the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis that section 28 im-
poses an affirmative duty on states not to enact legislation inconsistent
with the Securities Exchange Act. The Court found "nothing in its text
or its legislative history to suggest that it imposes any duty on the
States. . ... 64 The Court declared that section 28 "was plainly in-
tended to protect, rather than limit, state authority." 65 Moreover, noth-
ing in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 suggests that section 28 was
to apply only retrospectively, and thus not be applicable to the Wil-
liams Act and tender offers.66
Although Congress may implicitly preempt all state regulation in
an area by enacting a comprehensive scheme of legislation regulating
the whole field, the Williams Act is not such legislation. The Williams
Act is a disclosure statute and is not comparable, for example, to the
comprehensive federal regulation of aircraft noise that led the Court in
City of Burbank v. LockheedAir Terminal,67 to conclude that Congress
61. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
63. 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
64. Id. at 182.
65. Id. (footnote omitted). In Great Western, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
holding of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas that the Idaho
takeover statute was unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court decided the case on procedu-
ral grounds by holding that "venue did not lie in the Northern District of Texas." Id. at 180. The
Court explained that "[t]he merits of Great Western's claims may well depend on a proper inter-
pretation of the State's statute, and federal judges sitting in Idaho are better qualified to construe
Idaho law, and to assess the character of Idaho's probable enforcement of that law, than are
judges sitting elsewhere." Id. at 186.
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404,
1-34, 48 Stat. 881.
67. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). When Congress adopted the Williams Act in 1968, the Commission
and Congress did not have enough expertise with tender offers to attempt to devise a comprehen-
sive scheme of regulation. The chairman of the Commission testified "[t]his is a developing area,
one that is developing rather rapidly, and our understanding and experience is being enhanced
every day and with every new takeover bid." Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcommn on Securities
of the Senate Com on Banlcing and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1967) (statement of Ma-
1981]
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had preempted all state regulation in that area.
Furthermore, in the areas of securities and corporate law, the
Supreme Court has restricted federal involvement. In Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Green,6 the Court stated that "[a]bsent a clear indication
of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial
portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securi-
ties."69 Indeed, in SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 70 and Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware,7 1 the Court approved the dual federal
and state regulation of securities.
Ware presented a conflict concerning the enforceability of an arbi-
tration clause in an employment contract, between California law and
a New York Stock Exchange Rule promulgated pursuant to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.72 The Court upheld the state's refusal to
enforce a compulsory arbitration clause required under the New York
Stock Exchange Rule. Although the Court could have sidestepped the
preemption question by holding that the Stock Exchange rule did not
constitute federal law for purposes of the supremacy clause, the Court
upheld the law under conventional preemption analysis.73 The Court
did not "overlook the body of law relating to the sensitive interrelation-
ship between statutes adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal
and state sovereignties. 74 The Court noted that "Congress, in the
securities field, has not adopted a regulation system wholly apart from
and exclusive of state regulation. '7 5 The Court held "that the proper
approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both statutory schemes with
one another rather than holding one completely ousted.' "76
B. The Williams Act
In MITE Corporation v. Dixon, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals incorrectly equated differences between the Illinois Take-Over
Act and the Williams Act as impermissible conflict. However, the fact
nuel F. Cohen). Congress' failure to define what constitutes a tender offer further highlights that
Congress, in adopting the Williams Act, did not set out a comprehensive regulatory scheme.
TENDER OFFERS, supra note 37, at 1.
68. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
69. Id. at 479.
70. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
71. 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
72. Id. at 119.
73. See id. at 134-40.
74. Id. at 127.
75. Id. at 137.
76. Id. at 127 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
[Vol. 17:229
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that the Illinois statute may differ from the Williams Act is not disposi-
tive; the issue is whether the Illinois statute is repugnant to the Wil-
liams Act.77
Opponents of state takeover statutes contend that the purpose of
the Williams Act is to maintain a balance of neutrality between the
tender offeror and the management of the subject company. Propo-
nents of this view rely principally upon the following statement by Sen-
ator Williams:
This measure is not aimed at obstructing legitimate take-
over bids. In some instances, a change in management will
prove a welcome boon for shareholder[s]. . and. . . it may
be necessary if the company is to survive.
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance
the scales equally to protect. . . corporation[s], management,
and shareholders. . .. Every effort has been made to avoid
tipping the balance of [a] regulatory burden in favor of man-
agement or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of this bill is
to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockhold-
ers while at the same time providing the offeror and manage-
ment equal opportunity to fairly present their case.78
However, the legislative history of the Williams Act reveals a lack
of thoughtful analysis aimed at ensuring neutrality between the tender
offeror and the management of the subject corporation. The Supreme
Court in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,7 9 held that the sole con-
gressional purpose in enacting the Williams Act was the protection of
the subject company's shareholders confronted with a tender offer.80 In
Piper, the defeated initial tender offeror brought a damage action
against the subject company and the successful tender offeror. The is-
sue was whether an unsuccessful tender offeror had a private right to
recover damages from the subject company under the Williams Act.81
77. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 32, at 200-01 (A. Hamilton) (New Am. Lib. ed. 1961).
It is not, however, a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an
immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can by implication alienate and extinguish a
pre-existing right of sovereignty.
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division
of the sovereign power, and the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not
explicitly divested in favour of the Union, remain with them in full vigour, is not a
theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the
instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution.
Id.
78. 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967).
79. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
80. Id. at 35.
81. Id. at 4.
1981]
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The plaintiff set forth that the subject company, its management, and
the rival tender offeror had made materially misleading statements, in
violation of section 14(e) of the Williams Act, which deprived the
plaintiff of the opportunity to compete on a fair basis for control of the
subject company. The Court held that the defeated tender offeror had
no standing under the Williams Akct to bring an action for damages
because investor protection was the primary purpose of the Williams
Act, and neutrality between the tender offeror and the subject company
was only a resulting characteristic of the statuatory scheme.8 2 The
Court stated "Congress was indeed committed to a policy of neutrality
in contests for control, but its policy of evenhandedness does not go
. to the purpose of the legislation. . . . Neutrality is, rather, but
one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-
the protection of investors." 3 The Court declared that shareholders
confronted with a tender offer were "the constant focal point of the
committee hearings." 4 Similarly, the Court, in Rondeau v. Mosinee Pa-
per Corp ,5 stated that: "[tlhe purpose of the Williams Act is to insure
that public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender offer for
their stock will not be required to respond without adequate informa-
tion regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party. '8 6
The Court's position is supported by the testimony of the chairman of
the Commission who stressed that: "the principal point is that we are
not concerned with assisting or hurting either side. We are concerned
with the investor who today is just a pawn in a form of industrial war-
fare. . . . The investor is lost somewhere in the shuffle. This is our
concern and our only concern." 87
The Williams Act does not effectively provide shareholders of a
subject company an adequate time to make an informed decision about
82. Id. at 42-46. In Piter, the Court referred the defeated tender offeror to the state's law.
Despite the pervasiveness of federal securities regulation, the Court of Appeals con-
cluded in these cases that Chris-Craft's complaint would give rise to a cause of action
under [state] principles of interference with a prospective commercial advantage. Al-
though Congress is, of course, free to create a remedial scheme in favor of contestants in
tender offers, we conclude ... that "it is entirely appropriate in this instance to relegate
[the defeated tender offeror] and others in [that] situation to whatever remedy is created
by state law."
Id. at 40-41 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)).
83. Id. at 29.
84. Id. at31.
85. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
86. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
87. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomoa on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Ses. 178 (1967).
[Vol. 17:229
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a tender offer. The Williams Act does not expressly mandate that a
tender offer remain open for any length of time. The Williams Act
does, however, functionally provide for a minimum seven or ten day
offering period depending upon whether the offer is for all or a portion
of the shares of the subject corporation.88 Ten days is an incredibly
short time period in which to make an important business decision such
as that involved in a tender offer. When confronted with a tender offer,
shareholders of the subject corporation must decide whether to tender
their shares of the subject corporation to the tender offeror, sell their
shares of the subject corporation outside the tender offer, or retain their
shares of the subject corporation. Shareholders who purchased shares
of the subject corporation for long term investment may panic and sell
their shares due to the lack of time available to digest the information
as to the future policies of the subject corporation. Furthermore, the
congressional time schedule is such that potential competitors often do
not have time to make a competing offer.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has acknowledged that
shareholders confronted with a tender offer need more time to make an
informed investment decision. In discussing its proposed rules of Feb-
ruary 5, 1979, which would have required any tender offer to remain
open for at least thirty days from the date of its first publication, the
Commission noted:
[C]ertain tender offer practices have developed which increase
the likelihood of hasty decision making by security holders
confronted with a tender offer. . . . Tender offers of an ex-
cessively short duration increase the likelihood for hasty, ill-
considered decision making and the possibility for fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative acts or practices by a bidder and
others.8 9
The court of appeals in MITE Corp. v. Dixon, stated that:
In the absence of such evidence [of the actual effect of the
potential for delay], we ought not to second-guess Congress'
judgment that delay grossly in excess of that contemplated by
the Williams Act redounds to the detriment of stockholders
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)-(6) (1976). Rule 14e-1, however, provides a longer minimum
tender offer period. The rule states that any tender offer for non-exempt securities must be held
open for at least 20 business days from the date of commencement and if the offered consideration
is increased, the offer must remain open for at least 10 business days from the date notice of such
increase is first published, sent, or given to security holders. 17 C.F.RL § 240.14e-l(a)-(b) (1981).
89. 44 Fed. Reg. 9956, 9975 (1979).
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by substantially deterring the making of tender offers.90
The empirical evidence, however, does not support the claim that delay
deters tender offers. The number of tender offers has not decreased as a
result of states adopting takeover statutes.91
Nor does the empirical evidence support the contention that delay
allows management of the subject corporation to perpetuate itself in
office. The management of a subject company in an effort to defeat
tender offers has several options available. Those options include char-
ter revisions, repurchase by the subject company of its shares, defensive
mergers, the acquisition of a company which creates a potential anti-
trust or regulatory problem if the tender offer is successful, the
purchase by the subject company, at a premium, of its stock from the
tender offeror, triggering friendly tender offers, issuance of treasury
shares to investors who will not tender, long term employment con-
tracts, entering into restrictive loan agreements, and initiating legal ac-
tion against the tender offeror.92 Once a tender offer is made, however,
the subject corporation is generally taken over by someone.93 There-
90. 633 F.2d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 1980).
91. In 1970 three states had takeover statutes and thirty-four tender offers were made. In
1976 the number of states having takeover statutes had increased to twenty-three and the number
of tender offers increased to one hundred seven. In 1978 thirty-three states had takeover statutes
and the number of tender offers increased to three hundred twenty-five. See Appleton, The Pro-
posed SEC Tender Offer Rules-The Proposed Requirements, 32 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1381 (1977);
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target'r Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 101 n.1 (1979).
92. See A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 113-55 (2d
ed. 1981); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 234-76 (1973);
TENDER OFFERS, note 37 supra, at 193-202.
Delay significantly assists management in litigation arising out of tender offers. See Wachtell,
Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433 (1977), which outlines the incredibly
fast time table which exists in tender offer litigation:
You are operating in a pressure atmosphere where you have constant surprise. You have
.very little turnaround time. The company goes running for counsel: help us. You have
to commence litigation immediately. You have to get out your deposition notices. You
have to get out your discovery notices. You have to make your motions for expedited
discovery. You have to set up your teams for taking what could be two or three sets of
simultaneous depositions, often in different cities. You have to be prepared to flow all
the information you're getting from depositions and documents into affidavits and briefs
almost simultaneously with the taking of the depositions and the review of the docu-
ments. You have to be scheduling your applications for temporary restraining orders,
stays, preliminary injunctions and the like. You are essentially compressing into a span
of four, five or six days what would normally be months and months, if not years, of
typical big case litigation, including analysis of antitrust ramifications, industry studies,
competitive lines of product and the like. It is unique.
Id. at 1433.
93. Chatlos, The SEC vs. Investors on Tender Offers, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct., 1978, at 6:
The SEC's obsession with entrenched management proved to be an argument made of
stale pudding. A study of the death rate of target companies in the years prior to the
passage of the Williams Act revealed a mortality rate of 75% in tender offers.
Under the SEC's jurisdiction since then, the rate has risen to 85%. One must won-
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fore, delay often benefits shareholders of the subject company by fos-
tering an auction market for the subject company's stock. Potential
bidders need time to analyze the subject company, and the delay pro-
vided by the Illinois takeover statute affords potential competitive bid-
ders time to make competing bids. This competition provides a better
market for the subject company's shares.94
Although in an auction market the initial tender offeror stands a
greater chance to lose than in the absence of competitive bidding, this
does not make the Illinois statute unconstitutional. The congressional
purpose in enacting the Williams Act was not to guarantee the success
of the initial tender offer.9 5 Moreover, the fact that the potential of an
auction market developing for the shares of the subject corporation
may impede some tender offers from being made does not make the
Illinois statute unconstitutional. Congress in adopting the Williams
Act did not attempt to create the legal environment which would foster
the greatest number of tender offers. Senator Williams recognized that
the Williams Act imposes a cost on tender offerors and may impede
some tender offers from being made. Senator Williams stated that al-
though "the bill may discourage tender offers or other attempts to ac-
der whether the end game envisioned here was the benefit of investors or a 100% mortal-
ity rate of target companies.
Id.
See Flom, The Role of the Takeover in the American Economy, 32 Bus. LAW. 1299, 1299
(1977):
There is a question of [the] utility [of tender offers] under the various state takeover laws.
Do they, in effect, destroy the value of the takeover as a corporate tool? I think the
answer... is no. What the state takeover laws do, by and large, is merely provide for
delay. The delay will mean that you are not going to get quite the same bargain you
might otherwise have gotten on a short-fuse tender or so-called "Saturday night special."
But... once you put your offer on the table .. . the ball is in play and that company
will go somewhere. Then it is a bidding match and you have your opportunity to bid.
So, to that extent, it still is a very useful tool.
Id.
94. The Georgeson & Co., a prominent proxy solicitation firm, studied contested tender of-
fers. The study found that:
[I]n 20 offers a total premium of $186 million over the original bids accrued for the
benefit of investors as a result of the corporate auction process fostered by the state
restraints. On the other hand, during these 26 months only 2 competitive offers were
completed in seven days or less, involving a premium of approximately $7 million.
Through June 1978, the accumulative premium to stockholders was well in excess of $1.1
billion over the original bid, thanks to the state laws.
Chaltos, supra note 93, at 7.
A chart dramatically illustrating the benefit inuring to shareholders of a subject company as a
result of the auction market is set forth in The Great Takeover Binge, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 14, 1977,
at 176.
95. The tender offeror does not have "a right under the Williams Act to complete its tender
offer successfully." Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd sub nom. LeRoy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (improper venue).
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quire control by those who are unwilling to expose themselves to the
light of disclosure, this is but a small price to pay for adequate investor
protection. ' 96 Likewise, Chairman Cohen stated that although the
"disclosure required by the bills might discourage some tender offers, it
is perhaps a small price to pay for an informed choice by
shareholders. 9 7
The Illinois statute also eliminates the surprise permitted by the
Williams Act, which allows the disclosure materials to be filed simulta-
neously with the commencement of a tender offer.98 The original
tender offer legislation would have required that a tender offer be
preceeded by a twenty day advance notice to management of the sub-
ject company.9 9 The congressional election not to adopt this advance
notice provision does not preclude Illinois from adopting such a provi-
sion. Nor does the fact that federal law tolerates certain conduct neces-
sarily mean there is an affirmative federal policy encouraging such
conduct. Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland,' 1 presented the
issue of the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that prohibited oil
companies from owning gasoline stations and mandated that if refiners
gave any allowances to retailers, the allowance must be given to all
retailers. Exxon argued that section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman
Act' 01 did not prohibit oil companies from granting allowances and
that Maryland could not regulate allowances. The Court rejected Ex-
xon's argument and held that section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act
did not preclude Maryland's right to regulate allowances. 10 2
Section 7E of the Illinois statute provides for a fairness review of a
tender offer by the Secretary of State. 0 3 Congress, by enacting the
Williams Act, attempted to ensure that a tender offeror would provide
fll disclosure of all material information to the shareholders of the
subject company. The Williams Act is designed so that the ultimate
arbitrators of every tender offer are the shareholders of the subject
company. The Act protects those beneficiaries of the statute through a
policy of disclosure, by providing them information needed to make an
96. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967).
97. Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149,
151-52 (1966).
98. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211, § 137.54 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-1982).
99. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 28,256, 28,259 (1965).
100. 437 U.S. 117 (1977).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 13b (1976).
102. 437 U.S. at 133-34.
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.57E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
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informed investment decision. Section 7E of the Illinois statute, how-
ever, does not assist the shareholder in making an informed investment
decision; the section gives the Secretary of State power over the tender
offer."° A free market as envisioned by the Williams Act depends
upon individual decision making. In regard to tender offers falling
within the ambit of the Illinois statute, section 7E has the potential to
eliminate decision making by the market, by giving the Secretary of
State authority to preempt a shareholder's right to make any invest-
ment decision by refusing to register the tender offer. The presumption
that the Secretary of State's decision will be made in good faith does
not cure this evil of section 7E.105 "Thus, to the extent that Illinois has
chosen to rely upon its Secretary of State's judgment rather than upon
investors' own judgment after full disclosure of the relevant facts, its
regulatory scheme stands in fundamental conflict with federal law and
is therefore unconstitutional." 106
The Illinois statute, other than section 7E, does not stand "as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the-full purposes and
objectives of Congress." 10 Compliance with the other provisions of
the Illinois statute does not prevent the tender offeror from also com-
plying with the Williams Act. The information required to be disclosed
by the Illinois statute is essentially the same information required by
the Williams Act. The additional disclosure mandated by the Illinois
statute does not impinge on the congressional policy embodied in the
Williams Act; the additional disclosure merely gives the investor more
information on which to make an informed investment decision.
Moreover, Illinois will accept in lieu of the Illinois registration state-
ment, "a registration statement form or other filing required by a fed-
eral or state government agency . .. which . .. encompass[es]
disclosure requirements substantially equivalent to those contained in
...this Section."108 After compliance with the Illinois statute's twenty
day prenotification provision, and after a hearing, if one is held, the
tender offeror may proceed with the tender offer. Compliance with
those sections of the Illinois statute does not prevent the tender offeror
from complying with the pro rata, withdrawal, and disclosure require-
104. Id.
105. 633 F.2d at 494.
106. Id.
107. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (footnote omitted).
108. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121%, § 137.54-4D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
1981]
19
Bunch: Edgar v. Mite Corporation: A Proposed Analysis
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ments of the Williams Act. 109
VI. COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
In MITE, the court of appeals also held that the Illinois statute
violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The
court stated that "had the Secretary of State not been enjoined from
going forward in the instant case, over 23 million dollars of interstate
commerce would presumably have been affected."'" 0 Under the proper
commerce clause"' analysis, however, the pivotal inquiry focuses on
the benefit versus the cost of compliance with the statute and not the
more burdensome impact of noncompliance. For instance, the
Supreme Court has upheld the right of a state to establish the mini-
mum size of train crews for trains operating in the state.112 In those
cases, the Court focused on the cost incurred by railroads in complying
with the additional expense imposed on the railroads by the statutes
rather than on the cost of noncompliance with the statutes, which
would have resulted in trains lacking sufficient crews not being allowed
to operate in the states whose statutes were challenged.
The Illinois statute contains two jurisdictional bases. Tender of-
fers falling within the ambit of the statute are those in which ten per-
cent of the shares of the subject company are held by residents of
Illinois or those in which the subject company satisfies two of the fol-
lowing: (a) Has its principal executive offices in Illinois, (b) is organ-
ized under the law of Illinois, (c) has at least ten percent of its stated
capital and paid in surplus contributed by Illinois residents.11 3
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(6), (5), 78m(d) (1976). The tender offeror must also comply with the
provisions of the Illinois statute requiring the tender offer to be held open for a seventeen day
period and the Illinois pro rata provision. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 137.59C, 137.59D (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
110. 633 F.2d at 502.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." . . .
Adhering to the landmark case Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 143 (12 How. 299) (1851), the
Court established that:
[Tihe Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws
for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own
force created an area of trade free from interference by the States ...
[Tihe Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a
limitation upon the power of the States.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976) (quoting Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
112. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago R. Isl. & Pac. R.R., 393
U.S. 129 (1968); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931).
113. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 § 137.52-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982).
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The first jurisdictional base reflects Illinois' legitimate interest in
protecting Illinois investors. The second jurisdictional base reflects Illi-
nois' legitimate interest in regulating the internal affairs of corporations
having a substantial nexus with Illinois.
The extraterritorial reach of the Illinois statute enables Illinois to
control transactions between nonresident tender offerors and nonresi-
dent shareholders of the subject company when the jurisdictional base
of the statute is satisfied. This extraterritorial effect, however, does not
place an undue burden on interstate commerce. The Illinois statute
applies equally to Illinois and out of state tender offerors and does not
discriminate in favor of Illinois resident shareholders. 114 Under the
commerce clause, state laws which do not discriminate against out of
state goods or residents are governed by the standards enunciated in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc." s "Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits."' 16 Without the extraterritorial effect of the
Illinois statute, Illinois' regulation of tender offers for shares of corpo-
rations having a substantial nexus with Illinois would be ineffective.
The tender offeror would attempt to purchase the securities needed to
gain control of the subject corporation from the corporation's share-
holders located in other states.
Moreover, the extraterritorial reach of state corporation law is nor-
mal. A shareholder's relationship with the corporation and other
shareholders is governed by the law of the state under whose law the
corporation exists."17
The commerce clause does not prohibit the state of incorporation
from regulating the internal affairs of corporations incorporated in the
state. "[T]he act of becoming a member [of a corporation] is something
more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding relation,
and as marriage looks to domicil, membership looks to and must be
governed by the law of the State granting the incorporation."' 18 In
114. See id.
115. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
116. Id. at 142.
117. For instance, any shareholder of a Delaware corporation, no matter what the share-
holder's state of residence, is limited and protected by various sections of Delaware corporate law.
E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 173, 262 (1974 & Supp. 1980).
118. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629,643-44 (1935) (quoting Modem Woodmen of America
v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925)).
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Cort v. Ash, the Court noted "[c]orporations are creatures of state law,
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the under-
standing that, except where federal law expressly requires certain re-
sponsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will
govern the internal affairs of the corporation."'" 9
A tender offer involves an internal affairs matter of the subject cor-
poration as it impacts upon "the relationships inter sese of the corpora-
tion, its directors, officers, and stockholders" 120 and thus Illinois may
regulate the tender offer. A successful tender offer results in a change
of corporate control, a process which Illinois has a legitimate interest in
regulating. A tender offeror upon completion of a successful tender
offer takes control of the subject company and enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the subject company and its shareholders. A success-
ful tender offer is generally followed by the subject company having a
new board of directors, new management, and a new policy. A share-
holder who retains stock in the subject company functionally becomes
a shareholder in a new entity. Shareholders who only tender some of
their shares, or who have only some of their tendered shares purchased
by the tender offeror are in effect choosing new directors. Thus a
tender offer is analogous to a proxy solicitation which states tradition-
ally regulate. Indeed, the Senate report on the Williams Act recognized
that tender offers are unique transactions and not mere sales of securi-
ties between shareholders of the subject companies and third parties. 121
In MITE, the court of appeals stated that in regard to corporations
not organized under its laws, Illinois "has no interest in regulating
[their] internal affairs." ' Although the law of the state of incorpora-
tion will generally govern the internal operations of a corporation, a
state other than the state of incorporation may have sufficient nexus
119. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
120. Reese and Kaufman, The Law Governing CorporateAffalrs: Choice of Law andthe Impact
of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 1118, 1124 (1958).
121. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967):
It has been argued that a cash tender offer is a straightforward business proposition
which can be rejected or accepted by a shareholder like any other bid for his securities,
But where no information is available about the persons seeking control, or their plans,
the shareholder is forced to make a decision on the basis of a market price which reflects
an evaluation of the company based on the assumption that the present management and
its policies will continue.
The persons seeking control, however, have information about themselves and
about their plans which, if known to investors, might substantially change the assump-
tions on which the market price is based.
Id.
122. 633 F.2d at 502.
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with a corporation to apply its substantive corporate law. German-
American Coffee Co. v. Diehl-13 presented the issue of the right of a
corporation, incorporated in New Jersey, but with its main location of
business in New York, to pay dividends allowed by New Jersey corpo-
rate law but not by New York corporate law. The New York Court of
Appeals applied New York law. In rejecting the argument that the ap-
plication of New York law would violate the commerce clause, the
court stated:
This statute makes no attempt to regulate foreign corpora-
tions while they keep within their domicile. It is aimed
against them only while they elect to live within our borders.
The duty which it imposes arises only when they come to us,
and ends the moment that they leave us. Such a statute, how-
ever phrased, is, in effect, a condition on which the right to do
business within the state depends. . . If they take the cor-
poration out of the state, they may declare dividends as they
please. If they elect to keep it with us, they must not lead it
into paths of ruin. In these days, when countless corpora-
tions, organized on paper in neighboring states, live and move
and have their being in New York, a sound public policy de-
mands that our Legislature be invested with this measure of
control. If the control is irksome, it may be avoided by leav-
ing us. Even if the prohibited act is done in the home state, it
may be so bound up in its results with the business in this
state that we cannot view it with indifference. 124
Another analogous example of the application of a state corpora-
tion statute to a corporation not incorporated in the state is Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Sobreski. 25 In that case, Western Air Lines, Inc., a Dela-
ware corporation, had a charter that provided for cumulative voting.
An amendment of Western's charter eliminating this cumulative voting
provision triggered legal action. A Delaware court directed the airline
to adhere to the amendment change in electing directors. The Califor-
nia Corporation Commissioner obtained an injunction on the ground
that the challenged amendment constituted a sale of a security under
the California Securities Act and was inequitable. In order to protect
the rights of the California shareholders of Western, the California
Commissioner's actions enjoined not only the voting of the California
shareholders of the airline, but also shareholders located in other states.
123. 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915).
124. Id. at 64, 109 N.E. at 877 (citation omitted).
125. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
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The applicability of the Illinois statute in the MITE case is simi-
larly appropriate. Chicago Rivet's principal executive offices are lo-
cated in Illinois. More importantly, Illinois residents own over forty
percent of the shares of Chicago Rivet. Thus Chicago Rivet's substan-
tial nexus with Illinois justifies Illinois regulating the internal affairs of
Chicago Rivet.
VII. CONCLUSION
Except for section 7E authorizing the Secretary of State to decide
the substantive fairness of tender offers falling within the ambit of the
statute and to enjoin those found inequitable, the Illinois Business
Take-Over Act is constitutional. In enacting the Williams Act, Con-
gress attempted to insure that a tender offeror would provide full dis-
closure of all material information to the shareholders of the subject
company. The Williams*Act contains no language indicating that Con-
gress intended to regulate all aspects of tender offers. Shareholders of a
subject company confronted with a tender offer need the additional
time provided by the Illinois statute to make a considered informed
judgment about what they should do with their shares of the subject
company. Furthermore, the Illinois statute does not unduly burden in-
terstate commerce. Illinois has a right to protect investors residing in
the state and to regulate the internal affairs of corporations having a
substantial nexus with the state. The potential for delay of a tender
offer inherent in the Illinois statute does not significantly deter tender
offers for companies falling within the jurisdiction of the statute.
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